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In two experiments we examined the role of emotion, specifically worry, anxiety, and
mood, on prospection during decision-making. Worry is a particularly relevant emotion to
study in the context of prospection because high levels of worry may make individuals
more aversive toward the uncertainty associated with the prospect of obtaining future
improvements in rewards or states. Thus, high levels of worry might lead to reduced
prospection during decision-making and enhance preference for immediate over delayed
rewards. In Experiment 1 participants performed a two-choice dynamic decision-making
task where they were required to choose between one option (the decreasing option)
which provided larger immediate rewards but declines in future states, and another option
(the increasing option) which provided smaller immediate rewards but improvements in
future states, making it the optimal choice. High levels of worry were associated with
poorer performance in the task. Additionally, fits of a sophisticated reinforcement-learning
model that incorporated both reward-based and state-based information suggested that
individuals reporting high levels of worry gave greater weight to the immediate rewards
they would receive on each trial than to the degree to which each action would lead to
improvements in their future state. In Experiment 2 we found that high levels of worry
were associated with greater delay discounting using a standard delay discounting task.
Combined, the results suggest that high levels of worry are associated with reduced
prospection during decision-making. We attribute these results to high worriers’ aversion
toward the greater uncertainty associated with attempting to improve future rewards than
to maximize immediate reward. These results have implications for researchers interested
in the effects of emotion on cognition, and suggest that emotion strongly affects the focus
on temporal outcomes during decision-making.
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EFFECTS OF EMOTION ON PROSPECTION DURING
DECISION-MAKING
Decision-making is an important task that people must engage
in on a daily basis, and individuals vary in the degree of neg-
ative emotions like worry and anxiety that they experience in
decision-making situations. Decisions can have both immediate
and long-term effects. An individual is often faced with a choice
between one option that seems more appealing at the moment
and another option that, while not as immediately rewarding, is
the better choice in the long-run. For example, a college grad-
uate must decide whether to seek an immediate job that offers
a decent salary or to attend some type of graduate school that
will likely lead to a smaller income over the next few years,
but a larger income over the course of one’s lifetime. Similarly,
one could spend one’s annual bonus on purchasing something
now or invest the money and have more to spend later. Thus,
the tradeoff between maximizing immediate reward vs. seek-
ing greater delayed reward is pervasive to many decision-making
situations. Many of these situations require prospection or the
representation and consideration of the future value of decisions
(Peters and Buchel, 2011; Pezzulo and Rigoli, 2011; Gerlach et al.,
2014). One important issue that we address in the present work
is how specific emotions like worry, anxiety, and mood affect
prospection during decision-making.
Emotions can become intertwined in the decision-making
process. For example, both immediate and expected emotions
can influence the way in which a person makes his or her deci-
sions. In response to a new or threatening situation, a person may
have an immediate emotional reaction that is experienced at the
time of the decision (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). For exam-
ple, if a person goes into the doctor for a routine check-up and
is told that they need to have immediate surgery, an immediate
negative response, such as anxiety, may be evoked and influence
their behavior. On the other hand, a person may be told he or
she needs a medical procedure in the future, and anticipatory
emotions, such as worry, may be evoked. A person may have
expected consequences of the event that influence their decision
and future emotional reactions (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003).
Similarly, prospection is a phenomenon in which a person sim-
ulates the positive and negative consequences of a future event.
A person may pre-experience the event and pre-feel anticipated
emotions for the event. These simulations are influenced by pre-
vious experience and memories of similar events and the context
in which they occur (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). Thus, emotions
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are essential components to the prospection simulation process
and understanding how specific emotions predict prospection
responses is important in decision-making.
In examining the effect of emotions on prospection, it should
be noted that anxiety and worry are positively correlated, but dis-
tinct affective constructs. Anxiety is characterized by somatic feel-
ings of panic and distress, rumination, and a mental and physical
over-reaction to a perceived stressor (e.g., Cook et al., 1988; Reiss,
1991; Schmidt et al., 1997; Erskine et al., 2007). Worry can be
defined as a mental preoccupation with potential negative events
that may occur in the future (Mueller et al., 2010). Furthermore,
worry is characterized as future-oriented in that individuals tend
to worry about events that could occur in the future (Borkovec
et al., 1983; Brown et al., 1993). The role of worry in decision-
making situations that require prospection is an important issue
to address as high worriers could be predicted to be either more
or less future-oriented during decision-making. One possibility
is that high levels of worry are associated with more future-
oriented decision-making, and worry enhances prospection dur-
ing decision-making (Borkovec et al., 1983; Brown et al., 1993).
Thus, high levels of worry may be associated with enhanced pref-
erence for the future, rather than the immediate consequences
of each action due to a more future-oriented focus in high-
worry individuals. Another possibility, which we outline below,
is that worry is associated with greater intolerance of uncertainty
and high-worry individuals might prefer to maximize immedi-
ate reward because there is greater uncertainty surrounding the
possibility of improving future rewards or states. By examining
anxiety and mood, a state rather than trait affective emotion, in
addition to worry we seek to determine whether these emotions
have distinct effects on prospection during decision-making or
whether negative affect in general influences one’s decisions.
The decision-making literature distinguishes decision-making
situations involving risk from those involving uncertainty
(Johnson and Busemeyer, 2010). In situations involving risk out-
comes associated with each action are known along with the prob-
abilities of obtaining each outcome. For example option A may
offer a 100% percent chance of gaining $10, while option B may
offer a 50% chance of gaining $50 but also confers a 50% chance
of losing $30. Thus, the probabilities associated with each out-
come are known, but selecting option B would confer the risk of a
loss. In situations involving uncertainty the outcomes and proba-
bility distributions associated with each action are unknown and
must be learned from experience. One important point to note
is that decision-making situations can contain different degrees
of both risk and uncertainty. Risk is usually characterized by
known probabilities and rewards associated with each action,
with options conferring smaller chances of gains and/or greater
chances of losses deemed as riskier, while uncertainty is usually
characterized by unknown probabilities and rewards associated
with each action, with options with less well-known outcomes
being deemed more uncertain.
Anxiety has been associated with reduced tolerance for risk
during decision-making situations (Raghunathan and Pham,
1999; Maner and Schmidt, 2006). Negative emotions like anxi-
ety have been associated with an increased preference for low-risk
options during decision-making. For example, in the Balloon
Analog Risk Task (BART) participants earnmoremoney themore
they pump up a balloon, but they also risk having the balloon pop
if too many pumps are made (Lejuez et al., 2002). Highly anxious
participants tend to pump the balloon a fewer number of times
than less anxious individuals (Maner et al., 2007). Thus, in the
course of the task highly anxious individuals tend to favor the less
risky alternative of stopping sooner than the more risky alterna-
tive of trying another pump. Anxious decision-makers are also
more likely to choose options that confer high-probability small
rewards over low-probability large rewards than less anxious
individuals (Raghunathan and Pham, 1999).
While anxiety has been associated with risk avoidant behav-
ior, worry has been associated with an increased intolerance
of uncertainty (Ladoucer et al., 1997; Dugas et al., 1998; Buhr
and Dugas, 2006). This link between intolerance of uncertainty
and worry has remained strong even when accounting for other
factors often associated with worry like anxiety and depression
(Freeston et al., 1994; Dugas et al., 1997; Buhr and Dugas, 2002).
Temporal delays in which decision outcomes will be known
can create uncertainty (Luhmann et al., 2008). Decision mak-
ers may find temporally extended periods of uncertainty as to
what the outcomes of each decision are to be averse, and the
tendency to avoid long periods of uncertainty may be more pro-
nounced in participants with high levels of worry (Luhmann
et al., 2008). Recently, Luhmann and colleagues examined tem-
poral uncertainty by having participants choose from an option
that offered a 50% chance of immediate reward or an option
that would provide a 70% chance of reward after a delay of 5–
25 s. Participants who reported higher intolerance of uncertainty
were more likely to select the immediately rewarding option than
participants with lower intolerance of uncertainty. Thus, intoler-
ance of uncertainty was associated with an enhanced preference
for an option that provided an immediate outcome (50%) even
though this option was riskier in that it provided a lower proba-
bility of reward than the delayed outcome option (70%). In this
case, intolerance of uncertainty was related to uncertainty about
when the outcome would be known rather thanwhat the outcome
would be.
Uncertainty as to when decision outcomes will be known may
be very relevant to the concept of prospection, as prospection
involves thinking about how actions may or may not lead to
improvements in one’s future state. Options that lead to better
immediate outcomes may be viewed with greater certainty than
options that offer the prospect of improving one’s future state.
The possibility of future rewards from each action likely seems less
certain than the possibility of immediate rewards. Maximizing
immediate reward or “taking more now” involves less uncertainty
than selecting an option that offers the prospect of obtaining a
larger reward at a later point in time. Given the increased intol-
erance of uncertainty for high worriers, we predicted that high
levels of worry would reduce prospection regarding how each
action would lead to future reward and that high worriers would
show enhanced preferences for maximizing immediate reward
and reduced preferences for seeking larger delayed rewards, rel-
ative to low worriers. In the current work, we seek to directly
examine this hypothesis in two different decision-making tasks
that both involve prospection.
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In Experiment 1 we examine how worry, anxiety and mood
affect behavior in the “Mars Farming Task” where good perfor-
mance requires considering how each action affects both imme-
diate and delayed rewards given by each option (Gureckis and
Love, 2009;Worthy et al., 2011, 2012). This task involves decision-
making under uncertainty where participants must repeatedly
select from the available options to learn which option leads to
the best outcome. In the task, participants are given a hypothetical
scenario where they are astronauts testing two oxygen extrac-
tion systems that farm oxygen from the Martian atmosphere.
The amount of oxygen extracted on a given trial is shown in
Figure 1A. The amount given by each system is dependent on
the previous actions the participant has made. The “increasing”
option always gives a smaller amount of oxygen on each trial, but
it is the optimal choice because selecting it causes rewards for both
options to increase on future trials. Thus, selecting the increasing
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Oxygen given by each option. The amount of oxygen
given by each system was a direct function of the number of times
the increasing option had been selected over the previous ten trials.
“Maximum of increasing option” indicates how much oxygen was given
if the increasing option had been selected on all ten of the previous
trials, and “Minimum of decreasing option” indicates how much oxygen
was given if the decreasing option had been selected on all ten of the
previous trials. (B) Sample screen shot from the experiment.
Participants were given a cover story where they were asked to test
two oxygen-extraction systems on the Martian landscape. The oxygen
extracted on each trial was shown in the “Current” tank and then
transferred to the “Cumulative” tank.
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option will improve individual’s future state. The “decreasing”
option always gives a larger amount of oxygen on each trial, but
selecting it causes future rewards to decrease, making it the sub-
optimal choice, or leads to declines in individuals’ future state.
Thus, the option that provides the largest immediate reward (the
decreasing option)must be avoided in favor of an option that pro-
vides larger rewards on future trials the more often it is selected
(the increasing option). We predicted that individuals that report
high levels of worry would bemore likely than low-worry individ-
uals to repeatedly select the decreasing option because it would be
viewed with less uncertainty than the increasing option.
The task we use in Experiment 1 also allows us to apply
a sophisticated reinforcement learning model that assumes
that participants make decisions by weighing the degree to
which selecting each option will maximize immediate reward
or improve the participant’s future state. Applying this model
to the data allows us to directly infer the degree to which par-
ticipants engaged in prospection-based processing whether they
valued each option based on its ability to improve their future
state.
In Experiment 2 we examine the role of negative emotions in
a Delay Discounting Questionnaire task (DDQ; Richards et al.,
1999). This task serves as a conceptual replication of the Mars
Farming Task used in Experiment 1, and directly addresses
whether worry, anxiety, and mood affect preferences for imme-
diate vs. delayed reward. In the DDQ used in Experiment 2,
participants are directly queried regarding their preferences for
smaller amounts of money that would be given immediately vs.
larger amounts of money that would be given after a delayed
period of time (e.g., “would you prefer $5 now or $10 in 30 days”).
Greater preference for immediate reward is indicative of greater
discounting of delayed reward. We predicted that high worriers
would view delayed rewards with greater uncertainty, and, as a
result, would discount delayed rewards more than low worriers.
The two tasks we use across both experiments complement
each other well. The dynamic decision-making task involves
decision-making from experience, where nothing is initially
known about the rewards provided by each option and partici-
pants must learn from experience. In contrast, the DDQ used in
Experiment 2 involves decision-making from description where
the rewards given by each option are made clear, and partici-
pants have to indicate which option they prefer (Hertwig et al.,
2004). This is an important distinction because Experiment 1
requires learning about the rewards associated with each action,
while in Experiment 2 participants have full information about
the rewards given by each option and simply have to state their
preference. However, both experiments address the juxtaposition
between immediate and delayed reward which is relevant to many
decision-making situations.
Enhanced prospection should be evidenced by greater prefer-
ence for the increasing option in Experiment 1, and by reduced
discounting of delayed rewards in Experiment 2. Additionally,
enhanced prospection should be indicated by model-fitting
results that suggest greater attention to improving one’s future
state over maximizing immediate reward. All of these mea-
sures should indicate a more “forward-thinking” approach to
the decision-making tasks which is consistent with the idea of
prospection. We predicted these measures that are indicative of
enhanced prospection would be reduced for high worriers across
both experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
Participants
Fifty-six young adults enrolled at Texas A&M University com-
pleted the experiment for partial fulfillment of a course require-
ment. Participants were divided into high and low-worry groups
based on a median split of Penn State Worry Questionnaire
(PSWQ) scores (detailed below).
Materials and Procedure
Participants performed the Experiment on PCs using
Psychtoolbox for Matlab (version 2.5). The experiment was
approved by the Institutional Review Board. Participants were
asked to complete a number of questionnaires before the experi-
ment began. Participants first completed the PSWQ (Meyer et al.,
1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item scale that has demonstrated high
internal consistency and test-retest reliability and has been used
in several studies to measure self-reported worry (Meyer et al.,
1990; van Rijsoort et al., 1999).
Participants also completed the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) and the Beck Anxiety
Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988) to examine the roles of affect
and anxiety, in addition to worry. The BAI is a 21-item scale that
has shown high internal consistency and test-retest reliability and
some studies suggest that is has better convergent and discrimi-
nant validity than other anxiety scales like the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (Frydrich, 1992; Kabacoff et al., 1997). The PANAS
consists of two 10 items scales that separately measure positive
and negative affect. The two scales have high internal consistency,
are not highly correlated, and also demonstrate good test-retest
reliability (Watson et al., 1988).
After completing the questionnaires participants were then
given instructions for the decision-making task. Figure 1B shows
a sample screen-shot from the experiment. Participants were
given a cover story that they would be testing two extraction sys-
tems that farmed oxygen on Mars, and their goal was to extract
as much oxygen as possible. A similar paradigm has been used
elsewhere to examine other issues in decision-making (Gureckis
and Love, 2009; Otto et al., 2009; Worthy et al., 2011, 2012). On
each trial, participants were told to “collect oxygen using one of
the two systems” which appeared at the top of the screen. They
were allowed as much time as they wished to make a response.
After they had selected one of the systems, the amount of oxy-
gen they received for that trial was indicated in the narrow tank
labeled “Current,” and after another 1000ms the oxygen would be
emptied into the “Cumulative” tank. After 2000ms the next trial
would begin.
Participants performed a total of 250 trials in the task. The
rewards they received were based on the reward structure shown
in Figure 1A. Rewards were a function of the number of times
participants had selected the increasing option over the previous
ten trials. Thus, there was a “moving window” which kept a count
of the number of times the increasing option was selected over the
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previous ten trials. All participants began the experiment at the
mid-point (3) on the x-axis.
A line on the larger tank corresponded to the amount of oxy-
gen needed to sustain life on Mars. Participants were given the
goal of trying to collect this amount of oxygen over the course of
the experiment. The goal line was set at the equivalent of 18,000
points. This corresponded to selecting the optimal, increasing
option on roughly 80% of trials. Participants were told nothing
about the rewards available for each option or how the rewards
given were dependent on how often they had selected the increas-
ing option, but had to learn what rewards were given by each
option from experience.
RESULTS
Behavioral analyses
The total oxygen collected in the task and the proportion of tri-
als participants selected the increasing option were computed.
There was a nearly perfect correlation between these two mea-
sures (r = 0.99, p < 0.001). This was expected as the amount of
oxygen collected was directly dependent on how often partici-
pants selected the increasing option. Because of this association,
the proportion of trials that participants selected the increasing
option was used as the primary dependent variable that indicated
good performance in the task.
Next, the worry, anxiety, and positive and negative affect
scores for each participant were entered as predictors in a
linear regression with proportion of increasing option selec-
tions used as the outcome variable. Table 1 shows the corre-
lations between the proportion of increasing option selections
and each individual difference measure. There was no relation-
ship between anxiety, negative mood, or positive mood and
proportion of increasing option selections. However, there was
a significant negative association between worry and propor-
tion of increasing option selections. Additionally worry, anxi-
ety, and negative mood were all positively correlated with one
another. The results of the multiple regression indicate that
worry was the only variable that was a significant predictor of
performance in the task (β = −0.45, p < 0.01; negative mood,
β = 0.00, p > 0.10; positive mood, β = −0.05, p > 0.10; anxi-
ety, β = 0.06, p > 0.10). The partial correlation between worry
and performance was also significant (r = −0.37, p < 0.001).
The association between worry and performance is plotted in
Figure 2.
Table 1 | Correlations Between Performance and Individual
Differences in Experiment 1.
1 2 3 4 5
1 Performance – – – – –
2 Worry −0.41** – – – –
3 Anxiety −0.12 0.39** – – –
4 Negative mood −0.15 0.34** 0.28* – –
5 Positive mood 0.09 −0.34** −0.07 0.13 –
Performance was measured as the proportion of times participants selected the
increasing option throughout the task. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Having established that PSWQ scores were negatively associ-
ated with performance and that these scores were the most signif-
icant predictor of performance, participants were split into high
and low-worry groups based on a median split (Median = 50;
Range = 20–80). Twenty-eight participants were placed in each
of the low-worry and high-worry groups.
The proportion of times participants selected the increasing
option was examined in 50-trial blocks of the task. These are
plotted in Figure 3. A 2 (group) × 5 (block) repeated measures
ANOVAwas conducted and linear effects of block were examined.
There was a significant linear trend for block, F(1, 54) = 16.40,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.23, and there was a marginally sig-
nificant block × group interaction, F(1, 54) = 3.02, p < 0.10,
partial η2 = 0.05. There was also a significant effect of group,
F(1, 54) = 10.95, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.17. Over all trials par-
ticipants in the low-worry group (M = 0.52, SE = 0.04) selected
the increasing option more often than participants in the high-
worry group (M = 0.34, SE = 0.05). To analyze the locus of the
block × group interaction, we examined the linear trend for
block within each group. The linear trend for block was signif-
icant for low-worriers, F(1, 27) = 18.10, p < 0.001, partial η2 =
0.40, but there was no linear trend for block for high-worriers,
F(1, 27) = 2.49, p > 0.10.
Finally, the proportions of increasing option selections made
by participants during the final 50 trials of the experiment were
examined within each group to determine if participants learned
to prefer one option significantly more than would be expected
by chance (50%). Participants in the low-worry group (M =
0.61, SE = 0.03) selected the increasing option significantly more
often than expected by chance, t(27) = 3.05, p < 0.01, indicating
a learned preference for the increasing option. Participants in the
high-worry group selected the increasing option less often than
expected by chance, although the difference was only marginally
significant, t(27) = −1.95, p < 0.10. We performed the same
analysis on the proportion of increasing option selections dur-
ing the first 50 trials of the experiment. Both low-worriers,
t(27) = −3.31, p < 0.01, and high-worriers, t(27) = −6.62, p <
0.001, selected the increasing option significantly less often than
expected by chance, which suggests that both groups initially
favored the decreasing option but only low worriers eventu-
ally learned to select the increasing option more often than the
decreasing option.
Model-based analyses
We fit a HYBRID RL model similar to that recently used in other
work which individuals make decisions based on the immediate
version future effects of each outcome (Eppinger et al., 2013).
The model estimates both model-free reward values which are
based on the immediate rewards received after selecting each
option and model-based reward values which are based on the
future value of each action, including how each action affects
one’s future state. In addition we also fit a Baseline or null
model that assumes a stochastic response process (Yechiam and
Busemeyer, 2005; Worthy and Maddox, 2012; Worthy et al.,
2012).
The HYBRID RL model assumes that participants observed
the hidden state (s) on each trial, which was equivalent to the
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number of times the increasing option had been selected over
the previous ten trials. The model values options based on both
the probability of reaching a given state on the next trial (s′)
by selecting action a (the model-based component), and on the
rewards experienced in each state (the model-free component).
This model is similar to other models that have assumed that sub-
jects use state-based information to determine behavior (Gureckis
and Love, 2009; Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011; Eppinger
et al., 2013). Following each trial in state s and arriving in state s′
after having taken action a the model computes a state prediction
error (SPE):
δSPE = 1 − T(s, a, s′) (1)
Next, the model updates the state transition probability:
T
(
s, a, s′
) = T (s, a, s′)+ ηδSPE (2)
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Here η is a free parameter that controls the learning rate, or
effect of recent outcomes, for the state-transition probabilities.
The state-transition probabilities for all other states not arrived
at (denoted as s′′) are reduced according to:
T
(
s, a, s′′
) = T (s, a, s′′) · (1 − η) (3)
This ensures that all transition probabilities at a given state sum
to 1.
The model also tracks the model-free expected reward values
for each action in each state (QMF(s,a)) using a SARSA learner
[State-Action-Reward-State-Action (Morris et al., 2006; Gläscher
et al., 2010)]. On each trial the model computes the reward
prediction error (δRPE):
δRPE = r − QMF(s, a) (4)
The prediction error is then used to update the expected value for
the current state action pair:
QMF(s, a) = QMF(s, a) + αδRPE (5)
Here α is a free parameter that represents the learning rate, or
effect of recent outcomes,1 for state-action pairs on each trial. The
model also has the ability to allow reward information gained for
actions in a specific state to be generalized across states which has
been shown to improve model fits in the same task (Gureckis and
Love, 2009). For each state other than the state on the current trial
(denoted as s∗) the QMF value for the same action selected on the
current trial is updated:
QMF(s
∗, a) = QMF (s∗, a) + θ(5∗r − QMF (s∗, a) ) (6)
Here θ represents the degree to which the rewards received on
each trial are generalized to the same action in different states.
After updating state-transition probabilities and expected
reward value information the model the computes a model-based
value for each action in each state (QMB(s,a)) using a FORWARD
learner that incorporates the state-transition probabilities and the
Bellman equation to determine the future value of each action
(Gläscher et al., 2010; Eppinger et al., 2013). In this task there are
three possible states that participants will transition to on the next
trial (s′) following action a on the current trial (they can stay in
the same state or move up or down one state). We estimated the
QMB value for each state-action pair by the following equation:
QMB (s, a) =
s′(s+1)∑
s′(s−1)
T
(
s, a, s′
) ∗ max[QMB
(
s′, a′
)] (7)
1One important point to note is that these learning rate parameters do not
necessarily indicate better learning in the sense that participants learned the
task better, but are more indicative of the effect of recent outcomes (Hochman
et al., 2010). Higher estimates of these parameters would suggest that par-
ticipants utilized recent outcomes to a greater extent when determining the
expected value of each action.
This function multiplies the probability of transitioning to each
possible state on the next trial, having taken action a in trial t, by
the maximum expected reward in state s′ for either action.
The model then determines a net value for each action
(QNet(s,a)) by taking a weighted average of the model-based and
model-free expected values:
QNet(s, a) = ω · QMB (s, a) + (1 − ω) ·QMF (s, a) (8)
Where ω is a free parameter that determines the degree to which
choices are based on the model-based vs. model free components
of the model.
Finally, the probability of selecting each action is determined
using the Softmax rule:
P (a, t) = e
[β·[QNet (s,a)+π·rep(a)]
∑n
j=1 e[β·[QNet(s,j)+π·rep(j)]
(9)
Here β is an inverse temperature parameter that determines the
degree to which participants exploit the option with the highest
expected value. Larger β estimates are indicative of more consis-
tently selecting the highest valued option, and as β approaches
0 each option is selected randomly. The autocorrelation, or per-
severation parameter, π, accounts for tendencies to perseverate
(π > 0) or switch (π < 0) regardless of the outcome on the last
trial. For the option that was selected on the prior trial rep(a) is
set to 1, and for all other options rep(a) = 0 (Lau and Glimcher,
2005; Daw et al., 2011; Eppinger et al., 2013). In total the RL
model included six free parameters: η, α, θ, ω, β, and π.
The Baseline model had one free parameter for the two choice
task which represents the probability of selecting option a. This
parameter is subtracted from 1 to determine the probability of
selecting the other option. For the four-choice task the Baseline
model had three free parameters representing the probability of
selecting three of the four options on any given trial. The prob-
ability of selecting the fourth option is 1minus the sum of the
probabilities of the three other options.
Modeling results. We fit each participant’s data individually with
the HYBRID RL, and Baseline models detailed above. The mod-
els were fit to the choice data from each trial by maximizing
log-likelihood. We used Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)
compare the relative fit of the RL model to that of the Baseline
model (Akaike, 1974). AIC is used to compare models with differ-
ent numbers of free parameters. AIC penalizes models with more
free parameters. For each model, i, AIC is defined as:
AICi = −2logLi + 2Vi (10)
where Li is the maximum likelihood for model i, and Vi is the
number of free parameters in the model. Smaller AIC values
indicate a better fit to the data. To assess the degree to which par-
ticipants were fit best by the RL model relative to the Baseline
model we computed a Relative Fit metric by subtracting the AIC
of the RL model from that of the Baseline model:
Relative FitRL = AICBaseline − AICRL
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Larger values indicate a better fit of the model compared to the
baseline model (Worthy et al., 2012).
The RL model provided a much better fit to the data than
the Baseline model for both low and high-worry participants.
However, Relative FitRL values were significantly higher for low-
worry (M = 98.87, SE = 12.29) than for high worry partici-
pants (M = 51.64, SE = 9.66), t(54) = 3.02, p < 0.01. A multiple
regression with worry, anxiety, positive mood, and negative mood
entered as predictors of the relative fit of the RL model indicated
that worry negatively predicted Relative FitRL values, β = −0.36,
p < 0.05, although the overall ANOVA for the regression model
did not reach significance, F(4, 51) = 1.93, p = 0.13. None of the
other predictors reached significance.
Having established that the RLmodel provided a good account
for the data compared to the Baseline model, we next exam-
ined the best fitting parameter values for low and high worry
participants. These are listed in Table 2. We were particularly
interested in the ω parameter that weighed the contribution
of the model-based component of the model to participants’
choices. Data from low-worry participants were best fit by sig-
nificantly higher ω parameter values than data from high-worry
participants, t(54) = 3.78, p < 0.001. A multiple regression with
worry, anxiety, positive mood, and negative mood entered as pre-
dictors of ω parameter values showed that worry was a significant
predictor, β = −0.58, p < 0.001. The overall model was signifi-
cant, F(4, 51) = 4.85, p < 0.01, and none of the other predictors
reach significance.
We did not find any differences between low and high worriers
for any of the other parameters of the RL model.
Finally, we also performed a cross validation of the model by
using the best-fitting parameter sets from half of the participants
in the low worry and high worry groups to predict the perfor-
mance for the other half of participants in each group. For both
low and high worriers we performed 1000 simulations using the
RL model by sampling, with replacement a set of best-fitting
parameters from one subject for each simulation. This is sim-
ilar to the parametric boot-strap cross fitting analyses we have
performed in other work (Worthy et al., 2012, 2013).
Figure 4 shows the proportion of Increasing option selections
from the simulations compared to the actual performance from
the participants in each group whose best-fitting parameters were
not used to perform the simulations. Overall the simulated per-
formance aligned well with the performance from the observed
participants. However, the model did over-predict Increasing
Table 2 | Average Best-Fitting Parameter Estimates for the RL Model.
Low worry High worry
State learning rate (η) 0.54 (0.45) 0.54 (0.43)
Reward learning rate (α) 0.45 (0.44) 0.38 (0.47)
Reward generalization rate (uptheta) 0.13 (0.29) 0.19 (0.28)
Model-based weight (ω) 0.94 (0.08)*** 0.71 (0.31)***
Inverse temperature (β) 1.91 (2.04) 1.32 (1.92)
Perseveration (π) 5.32 (6.89) 5.73 (8.24)
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. ***Significant difference at
p < 0.001 level.
option selections within the first 50 trial block of the task for low-
worry participants, although that was the only block where the
simulated results were outside of the appropriate 95% confidence
interval from the observed participants.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that high levels of worry were
associated with a reduced prospection and an increased prefer-
ence for the more immediately rewarding option during decision
making. Interestingly we found that worry, anxiety, and negative
mood scores were all positively correlated with one another, but
worry was the only variable associated with decision-making
behavior, and the association between worry and performance
remained strong after partialing out the other factors. Low-worry
participants learned to prefer the increasing option, which led to
smaller immediate rewards but larger delayed rewards, more than
high-worry participants, and more than expected by chance. Our
modeling results suggest that low worry participants showed a
greater tendency to select options based on how selecting those
options would improve their future state. Parameter estimates
from the model were also able to mimic the performance of low
and high worry participants, as shown in our cross validation
analysis. Data from low worry participants were best fit by higher
ω parameter estimates which suggests that they exhibited a more
model-based rather than a model free decision-making style. This
led them to select the increasing option, which improved their
future state more than the decreasing option that maximized their
immediate reward.
While the effect of worry on decision-making behavior was
quite robust, this was, nevertheless, just one experiment where we
found these effects. In order to conceptually replicate and extend
our findings we had participants perform a delay discounting
task where they reported their preferences for receiving smaller
amounts of money immediately over a larger amount of money
after different delay periods.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2 we sought to directly examine how worry
affected preferences for immediate and delayed rewards by using
the DDQ where participants make hypothetical choices between
$10 available after a specified delay or a smaller amount avail-
able immediately (Richards et al., 1999). One difference between
the two experiments was that in Experiment 1 participants were
required to make decisions from experience where information
about the immediate and long-term rewards provided by each
option had to be learned from sampling each option, while
the DDQ used in Experiment 2 required decision making from
description where descriptive information about each option was
given beforehand and participants did not have to learn the con-
sequences of selecting each option over the course of the task
(Hertwig and Erev, 2009).
METHODS
Participants
Sixty-seven young adults enrolled at Texas A&M University
completed the experiment for partial fulfillment of a course
requirement.
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Materials and Procedure
Participants performed the Experiment on PCs using
Psychtoolbox for Matlab (version 2.5). The experiment was
approved by the Institutional Review Board. Participants were
asked to complete the same questionnaires used in Experiment 1
before the experiment began (PSWQ, PANAS, and BAI).
Participants were told that they would be repeatedly asked
whether they would prefer a smaller amount of money now or
a larger amount of money ($10) after a specified delay (1, 2,
30, 180, or 365 days). They were told that these questions were
hypothetical, but to try to answer as if they would actually be
receiving the money. The task used an adjusting procedure where,
for each delay period participants were initially offered $1 imme-
diately vs. $10 after the specified delay, and the immediate reward
that was offered was increased by $1 on the next trial until the
immediate and delayed rewards were equal. This procedure allows
for the derivation of an indifference point for each delay period
which is the smallest amount of money an individual chose to
receive immediately instead of the $10 offered after the delay.
Lower indifference points indicate greater discounting of delayed
rewards.
RESULTS
We used an area-under-the-curve (AUC) measure, as specified by
Myerson et al. (2001) as our measure of participants’ preference
for delayed vs. immediate rewards. Smaller AUC values indicate
greater discounting, or greater preference for immediate reward,
while larger values indicate reduced discounting, or greater will-
ingness to forego smaller immediate rewards in favor of larger
delayed rewards.
The worry, anxiety, and positive and negative affect scores for
each participant were entered as predictors in a linear regres-
sion with AUC values used as the outcome variable. Worry was
significantly negatively associated with AUC, as were positive and
negative mood. Table 3 lists the correlation coefficient matrix.
Anxiety was also negatively associated with AUC, although the
difference was not significant. Worry, anxiety, and negative mood
were strongly correlated with one another as in Experiment 1.
The results of the multiple regression indicate that worry (β =
−0.29, p < 0.05) and positive mood (β = −0.28, p < 0.05)2were
significant predictors of participants’ preferences for immediate
vs. delayed rewards after accounting for other predictors, while
anxiety (β = 0.05, p > 0.10) and negative mood (β = −0.16,
p > 0.10) did not uniquely predict preferences for immediate
vs. delayed rewards. Partial correlations for worry (r = −0.28,
p < 0.05), and positive mood (r = −0.28, p < 0.05) were also
significant. The association between worry and AUC is plotted in
Figure 5.
To further examine the relationship between worry and
delayed discounting, participants were split into high and low-
worry groups based on a median split (Median = 47; Range =
22–80). There were 33 low-worry participants and 34 high-worry
participants. Figure 6 shows the discounting curves for low and
high worry participants. An independent samples t-test showed
a significant effect of worry on AUC scores, t(65) = 2.09, p <
0.05. Low-worry participants (M = 0.54, SD = 0.28) had signif-
icantly higher AUC scores than high-worry participants (M =
0.42, SD = 0.21), which suggests greater discounting of delayed
rewards for high-worry participants.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results across two different decision-making experiments
suggest that high levels of worry reduce prospection and enhance
2The negative association between positive mood and AUC was an unpre-
dicted result that we will discuss in greater detail in the General Discussion.
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preference for immediate over delayed reward. We argue that
these results are due to worry leading to reduced preferences for
rewards that may occur in the future, which are likely viewed as
less certain. Experiment 1 required individuals to learn the imme-
diate and delayed consequences of each choice from experience
whereas Experiment 2 explicitly queried participants regarding
whether they would prefer a smaller immediate reward or a
larger delayed reward. Relative to low worriers, high worriers
demonstrated enhanced preference for immediate reward in both
experiments. Our results also suggest that worry, rather than
anxiety, or negative mood, was the variable most strongly asso-
ciated with decision-making behavior despite strong associations
between worry, anxiety, and negative mood in both experi-
ments. Thus, we can conclude that worry, rather than negative
affect in general, has an independent effect on prospection in
decision-making.
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Our results do not support the view that high worriers’
enhanced future orientated thinking styles increase prospection
and lead them to prefer maximizing delayed reward over imme-
diate reward (Borkovec et al., 1983; Brown et al., 1993). However,
one thing to note is that our experiments required participants
to maximize rewards that were gains, rather than to minimize
losses or negative outcomes. One possibility is that the enhanced
future-oriented thinking styles of non-worriers are specific to the
consideration of negative future events. While our results sug-
gest that high worriers favor maximizing immediate rather than
delayed rewards when rewards are positively valued, high worriers
may favor outcomes that minimize future losses more than out-
comes that minimize immediate losses. One recent study found
individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder were better able
to avoid options with greater long-term losses in a modified
version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Mueller et al., 2010).
However, the IGT is distinct from the tasks we have employed
in the present work in that it does not directly pit options that
are more immediately rewarding against options that are more
rewarding in the future. It is possible that more anxious indi-
viduals may react differently in situations where the context is
more risk-oriented by including losses in the decision framework,
while worriers may be more focused on minimizing uncertainty.
Consequently, future work should examine how negative emo-
tions like worry affect attention to both immediate and delayed
losses. One possibility is that higher levels of worry are associ-
ated with greater attention to delayed losses. Alternatively, high
levels of worry could simply enhance tendencies to avoid losses
regardless of whether they occur immediately or at some point in
the future.
One unexpected finding was that positive affect predicted
greater discounting of delayed rewards in Experiment 2. While
we did not predict this a priori, recent work has also found a
link between positive affect and poor decision-making (includ-
ing delay discounting). For example, Hirsh and colleagues found
that positive affect was associated with enhanced discounting
in extraverted individuals (Hirsh et al., 2010). In addition,
very high positive affect has been shown to increase risk-taking
behaviors, including drug use, sexual encounters and gambling
(Cyders and Smith, 2008) and it is posited that increased pos-
itive affect can interfere with orientation to toward pursuit
of long-term goals (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004) which may
result in greater orientation for the present and less focus on
Table 3 | Correlations Between Area Under the Curve (AUC) and
Individual Differences in Experiment 2.
1 2 3 4 5
1 AUC – – – – –
2 Worry −0.31** – – – –
3 Anxiety −0.20** 0.40** – – –
4 Negative mood −0.31** 0.36** 0.45*** – –
5 Positive mood −0.29** −0.07 0.20 0.15 –
Greater Area Under the Curve is indicative of reduced discounting or reduced
preference for immediate over delayed rewards. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
future goals/outcomes. While our finding of a positive association
between positive mood and discounting is exploratory, and
we did not measure any personality variables, future work
should consider whether the effect of positive mood on dis-
counting is robust, and whether it interacts with personality
variables.
While our results are consistent with the hypothesis that worry
is associated with reduced prospection during decision-making,
it’s important to note that our results could be due to some other
mechanism unrelated to prospection. However, our results clearly
demonstrate that worry is associated with enhanced preference
for immediate vs. delayed rewards. The tasks we used both cen-
tered on decision-making situations where immediate and future
rewards are placed at odds, and high levels of worry were asso-
ciated with greater discounting of delayed reward in both situa-
tions. Future work should aim to further our understanding of
how worry and other emotions affect thinking about future states
and actions, and how emotion affects behavior and cognition,
more broadly.
Worry is a commonly experienced emotion and many people
suffer from excessive worry despite realizing that it is not always
productive (Freeston et al., 1994). Despite worry being a future-
oriented construct and related to a desire to avoid negative future
events, our results suggest that high levels of worry may actually
impair people’s ability to engage in prospection andmake the best
long-term decisions. High worriers tended to maximize immedi-
ate reward at the expense of larger rewards in the future. Future
work should further address the relationship between worry and
prospection, including how the bias toward immediate reward
might be attenuated in high worry-individuals when it proves
counter-productive.
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